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Abstract 
The involvement of subnational actors in EU politics has become an increasingly 
recognized facet of European integration. However, this highlights an interesting 
puzzle: subnational authorities in unitary and centralized polities usually lack formal 
competence and have limited resources to engage beyond their territorial limits. Why, 
then, do they engage at the European level? This article addresses this question by 
exploring their motivations for participation in European transnational networking. 
These motivations are assessed against a Europeanization framework, exploring 
whether subnational authorities adopt the ‘logic of consequentialism’ or the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ when engaging in transnational networking. The article argues that 
subnational authorities are rational actors, maximizing the opportunities presented by 
the EU without subscribing to its normative aims. In a context marked by financial 
pressures and Brexit, these findings provide a useful foundation for analysing the 
ongoing EU–local relationship, and for explaining changes to subnational authorities’ 
approaches to European engagement. 
Keywords: Europeanization; subnational government; transnational networking; EU–
local relations 
Introduction 
The presence of subnational authorities (SNAs) at the European Union (EU) level is 
increasingly recognized. This includes recognition in the Committee of the Regions, the 
  
presence of local and regional representative offices in Brussels (for example Rowe, 
2011; Tatham, 2010, 2016) and engagement in subnational transnational networks (for 
example Heinelt and Niederhafner, 2008; Huggins, 2017; Kern and Bulkeley, 2009; 
Payre, 2010). These activities have led to a growing literature on local level 
Europeanization (for example Barbehön, 2016; Benz and Eberlein, 1999; de Rooij, 
2002; Goldsmith, 1993, 2003, 2011; Hamedinger and Wolffhardt, 2010; Huggins, 2017; 
John, 2000, 2001; Kern and Bulkeley, 2009; Kettunen and Kungla, 2005; Marshall, 
2005; Pflieger, 2014; Van Bever et al., 2011). 
One feature of this has been SNAs’ engagement in transnational networking 
(TN). This encompasses voluntary horizontal links between subnational actors across 
national borders. This activity comes in a variety of forms. A distinction can be made 
between informal networks of subnational officials sharing information (for example 
Beyers and Donas, 2014) or membership of more formalized partnerships and 
associations. This article focuses on the latter. This itself is marked by diversity. Some 
networks act as peak associations, representing broad subnational interests, while others 
focus on particular geographical areas or have particular policy focuses (Benington and 
Harvey, 1994; Ward and Williams, 1997, p. 441). Networks often include a range of 
non-governmental subnational actors too, such as universities or businesses. Networks’ 
size also varies. Some are bilateral partnerships between two SNAs, while others are 
multilateral (Huggins, 2017; Kern, 2014, p. 115). Co-operation can also be open-ended 
or temporary to deliver particular projects. 
While TN is indicative of the Europeanization processes affecting SNA, wider 
international engagement has also been witnessed. This includes engagement in global 
transnational networks, particularly with a focus on environmental policy such as the 
  
C40 cities network (for example Bouteligier, 2013; Lee, 2014), and the emergence of 
trans-Atlantic bilateral partnerships (for example Casson and Dardanelli, 2012). 
For SNAs in unitary and centralized polities, however, engagement in TN 
presents an interesting puzzle. Engagement in TN is voluntary. Furthermore, these 
SNAs usually lack the formal competence to engage beyond their territorial limits and 
their budgets are often heavily constrained. These financial constraints have recently 
been exacerbated by the financial crisis and austerity. However, while some SNAs are 
reassessing their EU engagement activities as a result of this (Guderjan, 2015; Guderjan 
and Miles, 2016, p. 642), engagement in TN remains commonplace. Why, then, are 
these SNAs investing in an activity which they are not mandated to undertake, while 
available resources to deliver their core and statutory functions are increasingly under 
pressure? This article addresses this puzzle, providing an insight into what drives these 
SNAs to participate in TN. In doing so it advances a wider debate on the impact of local 
level Europeanization to change subnational behaviour by arguing SNAs are rationally 
driven when engaging at the European level. In context where opportunities for EU 
level engagement are constantly changing, this has important and timely implications 
for understanding the long-term impact of local level Europeanization. SNAs engage 
because it is in their interest, and their presence at the European level is not permanent. 
This article therefore offers a useful foundation for assessing ongoing changes to the 
EU–local relationship, as well as how SNAs are responding and adapting their 
European engagement activities to this context. 
This article analyses the TN activities of 14 SNAs in South East England and 
Northern France.[1] These cases are typical of SNAs in unitary and centralized polities 
having relatively limited levels of independent authority and capacity to act (Hooghe et 
al., 2016). While French SNAs enjoy constitutional protection whereas English SNAs 
  
do not, subnational actors in both polities are subject to fluctuating institutional 
landscapes, exemplified by the amalgamation of French régions in 2016 and a complex 
and inconsistent mix of Local Enterprise Partnerships, combined authorities and ‘city 
deals’ in England. They have similarly both faced budgetary pressures brought by 
austerity and decreased central government grants. These cases therefore allow the 
puzzle of why SNAs with limited formal competence to engage internationally 
nevertheless engage in TN while simultaneously facing financial pressures to deliver 
their core services to be addressed. Furthermore they have an established tradition of 
engaging in TN (Church and Reid, 1996, 1999). Between 2001 and 2011, they were 
involved in 302 transnational links (Huggins, 2017). As a result they have been heavily 
exposed to Europeanization processes over at least 30 years. These cases therefore 
represent a good testing ground to assess how SNAs have engaged with these processes, 
and whether lengthy exposure to Europeanization has affected their behaviour. 
The empirical findings come from an analysis of 68 qualitative semi-structured 
interviews with subnational officers, councillors and others involved in TN. These 
participants played a direct role in their respective organizations’ TN activity, including 
in decisions on whether to participate. Interviews were complemented with an analysis 
of over 100 documents produced by SNAs, largely dating between 2001 and 2011. This 
period captures the onset of the financial crisis, permitting an analysis into why SNAs 
continue to engage in TN despite the restrictive effect this context has on their 
resources. 
This article firstly surveys existing research on local level Europeanization, 
making a distinction between rational Europeanization and sociological 
Europeanization as a useful framework to understand the underlying logic driving this 
process. The second section outlines the motivations held by SNAs for participating in 
  
TN. The third section assesses these motivations in detail. It finds SNA engagement in 
TN is goal orientated and driven by a desire to improve SNAs’ own position and secure 
competitive advantage. Furthermore it is based on an assessment of the prevailing 
context and the outcome of a favourable cost–benefit analysis which effectively 
depoliticizes engagement. Engagement takes place with full awareness of its limitations. 
This confirms SNA engagement in TN to be rationally driven. An absence of 
sociological drivers reinforces this. The article concludes by considering the 
implications of these findings in light of contemporary developments in European 
politics. 
Local level Europeanization: rational versus sociological logics 
The concept of Europeanization has been readily applied to the subnational level (for 
example Barbehön, 2016; Benz and Eberlein, 1999; de Rooij, 2002; Goldsmith, 1993, 
2003, 2011; Hamedinger and Wolffhardt, 2010; Huggins, 2017; John, 2000, 2001; Kern 
and Bulkeley, 2009; Kettunen and Kungla, 2005; Marshall, 2005; Murphy, 2007; 
Pflieger, 2014; Van Bever, et al., 2011). Early research on local level Europeanization 
focused on the extent to which SNAs had become ‘Europeanized’ (Goldsmith, 1993; 
Goldsmith and Klausen, 1997; John, 2000, 2001). While it is argued that all SNAs are 
affected by Europeanization, differentiation in the extent to which they have been 
Europeanized was observed (de Rooij, 2002; Goldsmith and Klausen, 1997; 
Hamedinger and Wolffhardt, 2010; John, 2001; Le Galès 2002), resulting in a ‘variable 
geometry Europe’ (Le Galès, 2002, p. 110). This is accounted for by variances in local 
resources and local political leadership which mediate the impact of Europeanization at 
the local level (de Rooij, 2002; Oikonomou, 2016; Pflieger, 2014). 
  
More recently, local level Europeanization research has focused on 
directionality. Europeanization is seen as inherently top–down. European policies, 
processes and practices are seen to be ‘downloaded’ to lower levels. Yet those affected 
by the pressures of Europeanization also proactively shape them. In this bottom–up 
conceptualization, actors ‘upload’ their preferences to the EU, reducing the eventual 
costs of ‘downloading’ EU policy, for example (Börzel, 2002, p. 196). Horizontal 
Europeanization processes are also identified (Graziano and Vink, 2013, p. 47). Here 
the EU provides a reference point for actors to co-operate and share policies and 
practices with each other. 
These dynamics are present at the subnational level. While local level 
Europeanization can be characterized as top–down, with SNAs having to implement 
and comply with EU legislation and policy, the EU is seen as an opportunity structure. 
Through representation offices in Brussels and TN, subnational preferences are 
‘uploaded’ to the EU (Van Bever et al., 2011, pp. 18–20). Consequently, local level 
Europeanization has been characterized as a co-operative process (Schultze, 2003). 
Additionally the role of TN to foster policy learning and transfer between SNAs 
illustrates the presence of horizontal Europeanization (Kern and Bulkeley, 2009; Van 
Bever et al., 2011). 
The differentiated impact of local level Europeanization, together with the 
presence of bottom–up and horizontal dynamics, suggests SNAs are not passive actors 
in EU politics. Rather they are proactive and voluntarily engage. This leads to a 
question of why SNAs engage. Europeanization literature offers two potential 
explanations. Europeanization can follow the logic of rational choice institutionalism or 
sociological institutionalism (Börzel and Risse, 2003). Under rational Europeanization 
actors follow the logic of consequentialism. They are goal oriented, seeking to improve 
  
their position. Europeanization is thus a reaction to potential opportunities or 
constraints, and the result of a cost–benefit analysis, where the cost of becoming 
Europeanized is outweighed by the benefits it brings, such as additional resources, 
competitive advantage or reducing the costs associated with Europeanization itself 
(Börzel and Risse, 2003, pp. 63–65; Hamedinger and Wolffhardt, 2010, pp. 15–16). 
That actors seek to pursue their own interests does not preclude them working together, 
since there is dependence between them (Börzel, 2005, p. 52). This model sees SNAs 
engage with Europeanization processes because it is in their interest. Under sociological 
Europeanization actors follow the logic of appropriateness. Their behaviour is 
determined by EU rules, norms and preferences which become internalized through 
learning and socialization processes (Börzel and Risse, 2003, pp. 65–67; Hamedinger 
and Woffhardt, 2010, p. 16). As Börzel (2005, p. 54) argues, ‘rather than maximizing 
their subjective desires, actors seek to “do the right thing”’. Here SNAs follow a ‘me-
tooism’ logic (Duchacek, 1984), engaging with Europeanization processes because it is 
deemed appropriate. 
While the utility of applying this rational–sociological model to local level 
Europeanization has been recognized (Hamedinger and Woffhardt, 2010), its 
application is limited, and the underlying logic driving SNAs’ Europeanization remains 
unclear. Local level Europeanization is sometimes viewed as a process of change 
marked by the learning EU rules and norms, fitting the sociological explanation. John 
(2000, p. 882), for example, sees full local level Europeanization as ‘a more 
fundamental transformation that goes beyond short-term instrumental behaviour, 
whereby local policy-making becomes an aspect of the EU, and European ideas and 
practices become transferred to the core of local decision-making’. Marshall (2005, pp. 
676–677) similarly observes that English SNAs have ‘adjusted to European norms of 
  
direct lobbying, partnership working and long-term strategic programming’ resulting in 
localities ‘revisioning’ themselves in European terms. Yet there are perceived limits to 
sociological Europeanization at the local level. Pflieger (2014) showed participation in 
the EU’s City-Vitality-Sustainability (CIVITAS) programme was a means to achieve 
pre-existing strategic goals and self-promotion. Research investigating the international 
activities of SNAs more broadly concurs (for example Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004; 
Lefèvre and d’Albergo, 2007; van der Heiden, 2010). Both processes can occur 
simultaneously. While SNAs may adopt a rationalist approach to Europeanization, 
sociological Europeanization can still take place as subnational actors are exposed to 
European norms (Bache, 2008, p. 158; Dąbrowski, 2012, 2013, p. 1370). 
Nonetheless, empirical analysis into the rationalist and/or sociological logic 
driving Europeanization at the local level, and especially TN, remains limited. This 
article therefore addresses this gap by surveying long-term SNA engagement in TN, and 
informs wider debates on local level Europeanization and the role of subnational level 
in European integration by providing a useful foundation to understand SNAs’ motives 
for EU engagement. 
Transnational networking and subnational motives 
Existing literature on subnational transnational networks reveals several functions and 
services they provide for their members. These include securing EU funding (for 
example McAleavey and Mitchell, 1994; Pflieger, 2014), lobbying EU institutions and 
influencing EU policy (for example Heinelt and Niederhafner, 2008; Ward and 
Williams, 1997), engaging in policy transfer (for example Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004; 
Kern and Bulkeley, 2009; Salskov-Iversen, 2006) increasing the profile of local areas 
(for example Payre, 2010; Phelps et al., 2002; van der Heiden, 2010) and encouraging 
  
inward investment and economic development (for example Heeg et al., 2003; Payre, 
2010). However, while the stated purpose of transnational networks is relatively well 
known, little is understood about the underlying logic driving SNAs’ participation, and 
subnational motivations for transnational engagement do not necessarily match the 
stated function of networks. 
Three motivations stand out: obtaining funding, influencing EU policy and 
policy transfer. Regarding obtaining funding, SNAs saw TN as a way to find out about 
available funding opportunities and access support to bid under programmes regularly 
perceived as administratively burdensome. Networks can offer ‘ready-made’ 
transnational partnerships, which were usually a requirement for EU territorial co-
operation programmes, thus reducing the effort in finding suitable partners and limiting 
risks associated with working with unknown partners. Regarding lobbying and 
influence, SNAs acknowledged the burden of EU legislation they were required to 
implement. While they recognized the EU was receptive to SNAs’ input, they were also 
aware of the competitive lobbying environment present at the European level. TN here 
provided a means to access the EU policy process, by pooling resources and 
aggregating local interests, and presenting SNAs as representative and credible 
stakeholders in the eyes of EU policy makers. Regarding policy transfer, SNAs sought 
to identify and apply best practice or policy innovation. TN provided a platform for this 
exchange of knowledge and enabled SNAs to access best practice from abroad. TN also 
provided a way for innovative SNAs to ‘showcase’ their own best practices. 
There are more general observations. Firstly, in seeking these benefits, SNAs 
referred to a range of contextual factors they were trying to address, such as an adverse 
economic climate, restricted local budgets, the impact of EU legislation and a 
  
competitive policy arena. In this way TN represented an ‘opportunity structure’ which 
SNAs have used to address the impact of this context and improve their overall position. 
Secondly, the presence of several motivations demonstrates that SNAs sought a 
number of simultaneous benefits from their TN activities, as opposed to any single 
overriding one. The diversity of motivations present in any one SNA is illustrated when 
examining the aims of European activity in strategic documents (Brighton and Hove 
City Council, 2007; Conseil Régional de Bretagne, 2011; East Sussex County Council, 
2000; Kent County Council, 2007a; Southampton City Council, 2007; West Sussex 
County Council, 2001, 2002, 2006). Often these multiple motivations serve one another. 
For example, engagement in policy transfer enhances SNAs’ profiles as policy 
innovators, which then assists in finding partners for EU-funded projects, or enhances 
the credibility of lobbying positions. This diversity of motivations reinforces criticisms 
made by some (for example John, 2000, p. 881; Kern and Bulkeley, 2009, p. 310) that 
existing literature on SNAs’ engagement in EU politics is too heavily focused on EU 
funding and regional policy, or on subnational interest representation. 
Thirdly, motivations vary. This was highlighted by several transnational network 
and Interreg staff, participants who were often in a position to observe the motivations 
of several SNAs at once. As argued below, this variation suggests a strategic approach 
to TN, where SNAs seek benefits according to their individual pre-determined 
strategies. 
Finally, motivations for participation in TN change over time. Sometimes this 
occurs as a result of exposure to TN itself; the longer a SNA is involved in a network 
the more chance it has to be exposed to benefits beyond its original motivations to 
join.[2] More often, however, this occurred because of a shift in SNAs’ strategic 
priorities, often occurring because of a change in political leadership. 
  
Transnational networking as rationalist Europeanization 
The analysis of motivations for engagement in TN confirm the process of local level 
Europeanization in the SNAs studied to be rationally driven. Five features characterize 
this: participation is goal orientated, SNAs seek to improve their own positions and 
secure competitive advantage, participation is based on an assessment of the context, 
participation is based on a cost–benefit analysis, and there is an awareness of the limits 
to TN. An absence of sociological drivers, marked by two characteristics, reinforces 
this. Firstly SNAs ceased participation in TN when it no longer met their interests, 
suggesting limits to the internalization of networking behaviour and ‘me-tooism’ as a 
driver. Secondly, altruistic motives which went beyond SNAs’ self-interest were not 
present. 
A goal orientated approach 
SNAs are goal oriented, participating in TN to achieve their own strategic aims. This 
link between a SNA’s aims and the motivations behind their TN activities is confirmed 
when analysing strategic documents, which highlight how specific benefits of TN assist 
in achieving specific strategic objectives (Brighton and Hove City Council, 2007; 
Conseil Régional de Bretagne, 2011; East Sussex County Council, 2000; Kent County 
Council, 2007a; Southampton City Council, 2007; West Sussex County Council, 2001, 
2002, 2006). Brighton and Hove City Council’s (2007) international strategy, for 
example, ‘aims to contribute to the delivery of the council’s strategic priorities: the 
emphasis being on complementing existing or planned council activity’. Participants 
also stated their SNA’s motivations were rooted in achieving their wider strategic plan. 
As noted by one: ‘obviously we’re always working towards our main council strategies 
and the various different strategies for different departments and business plans and so 
  
on’.[3] Further evidence of this is found in documentation seeking approval for 
participation in transnational networks. Figure 1, for example, shows how one SNA 
links cases of TN to specific elements of their community strategy and corporate plan. 
In seeking approval to participate in one EU-funded transnational project, another report 
noted that co-operation ‘contributes to the City and Employment Skills Plan’s (CESP) 
2011–2014 vision, in particular to “priority three” of the plan which seeks to ensure that 
local residents are equipped to compete for jobs in the city’s labour market’ (Brighton 
and Hove City Council, 2011). 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Crucially SNAs did not change their behaviour, but maintained pre-existing 
goals. TN was seen as an opportunity to contribute towards achieving these pre-
determined goals. This mirrors Pflieger’s (2014) findings, which showed French cities 
strategically engaged in the CIVITAS programme as a means to achieve existing 
projects which would have been undertaken regardless. 
This goal orientated approach also accounts for the differentiation in the 
motivations held by SNAs. As strategic objectives vary between SNAs, so their reasons 
for participating in transnational networks do too. In particular this affects which 
networks SNAs choose to engage with, as they seek to pursue specific thematic policy 
interests (van der Heiden, 2010, p. 132). For example, the Isle of Wight’s participation 
in the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR) and Islands Commission 
was motivated by their interest in coastal erosion mitigation.[4] Basse-Normandie’s 
large agricultural sector made participation in the Association of European Regions for 
Products of Origin and Assembly of the European Regions Producing Fruit, Vegetables 
and Plants a priority.[5] The mix of urban and rural areas across South East England 
  
meant involvement in the Peri-Urban Regions Platform Europe network was a priority 
several SNAs here (SEERA, 2004, 2005). 
Evidence of this policy centric approach can also be found with transnational 
networks which are not policy specific and appear more general purpose in nature. Such 
networks organized themselves into a number of thematic working groups, forums and 
sub-networks. Brighton and Hove, which had corporate priorities in promoting the 
digital economy and cultural policy, pursued its thematic interests through Eurocities’ 
knowledge society and culture forums.[6] Hampshire was able to pursue its interest in 
education and environmental policy through the relevant Assembly of European 
Regions (AER) sub-groups.[7] 
In cases where there were no pre-existing networks focused on a SNA’s area of 
strategic interest, they often established new ones. Bretagne, for example, had a long 
standing interest in maritime policy, leading to their role establishing the CPMR (Wise, 
2000). As explained by a French regional officer: ‘there is a very strong link between 
Brittany and this network, because it’s a maritime network and we are a maritime 
region’.[8] West Sussex likewise co-established the Airport Regions Conference due to 
the strategic importance of Gatwick Airport and aviation policy to the county.[9] 
Establishing new networks requires significant effort and resources (van der Heiden, 
2010, p. 150), and so SNAs would only make this investment if it directly contributed to 
their overriding strategic objectives. 
This goal orientated approach is further illustrated by cases where motivations 
for participation changed as a result of a shift in local priorities, usually occurring 
following a change in political leadership. For example, before 2005 the Isle of Wight 
was heavily involved in lobbying activities and policy transfer, sharing knowledge with 
other coastal regions on landslide and erosion issues as these were strategic priorities. 
  
From 2005 and the election of a new administration, their strategy shifted away from 
this, with more emphasis placed on obtaining funding.[10] This ultimately led to their 
withdrawal from the CPMR and Islands Commission, as the lobbying and policy 
transfer advantages these networks brought were no longer deemed important (Isle of 
Wight Council, 2005). 
Improve positions and secure competitive advantage 
SNAs’ engagement in TN is characterized by their self-interest and a determination to 
improve their own individual positions. Indeed, the motivations outlined above all 
reflect SNAs’ desires to secure benefits for their own organization, as opposed to 
contributing to wider European policy goals. While in some cases participants referred 
to altruistic motives, for example in sharing examples of best practice, this was due to 
the overriding motivation of improving SNAs’ profiles by promoting themselves as a 
policy innovator, or, in the words of one participant, ‘best in class’.[11] Indeed, it was 
felt that such an improved profile brought with it greater success in obtaining funding 
and securing economic investment as it raised awareness among key EU funders. It also 
improved the chances of influencing EU policy as being recognized as a policy 
innovator meant being regarded as an expert, which accorded credibility to the policy 
positions SNAs promoted. This confirms Lefèvre and d’Albergo’s (2007, p. 312) 
speculation that ‘even some apparently socially orientated international activities might 
actually be interpreted as motivated by economic aims’. 
While TN is inherently co-operative, participants also noted that they were 
motivated by trying to secure competitive advantage vis-à-vis other SNAs, particularly 
for limited resources or opportunities such as funding and economic investment. SNAs 
often viewed other network members as competitors rather than partners. For example 
  
Brighton and Hove City Council (2008) justify participation in Eurocities by 
acknowledging it: 
contains Belfast, Birmingham, Bradford, Bristol, Cardiff, Hull, Leeds, 
Liverpool, London, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, Sheffield, 
Southampton and Sunderland. Whilst there are all potential partners they are 
all potential rivals economically within the UK so parity of information and 
influence and visibility on a European and international stage is crucial. 
In obtaining funding, SNAs were aware of the competitiveness of EU programmes. 
Medway Council (2003), for example, highlights the need to have ‘a head start over 
potential competitors for funds by providing information in advance’. The requirement 
to work with others through TN in order to be eligible for EU funding was similarly 
acknowledged. Indeed following EU enlargement in 2004 many SNAs established 
transnational links with counterparts in central and eastern Europe to ensure continued 
eligibility.[12] As one participant explained: 
I could see the structural funds in Europe were gradually going to shift 
towards helping eastern Europe, because that’s where the money was 
needed, and if we as a British county wanted to go on receiving we need to 
have links with them.[13] 
The need for competitive advantage in lobbying was equally recognized, with 
participants highlighting the potential to be ‘drowned out’ by other, better resourced 
actors in Brussels, including other SNAs. As highlighted by one: 
we’re trying to make sure that the concerns of Hampshire are not forgotten. 
I mean I’m not remotely surprised to discover that … councillors from 
  
Manchester might be popping up somewhere, they going to push for the 
interests of Manchester. Or Liverpool, you’ve got Liverpool and 
Southampton at war with each other over cruise terminals. Well don’t be 
surprised at a meeting where Liverpool representatives are, they’re going to 
push in interests of Liverpool … We’ve got to be there and fight our own 
corner.[14] 
Nevertheless, given the relatively small size and limited resources of subnational actors, 
there was recognition that they could not have a meaningful impact on EU policy while 
acting alone. 
Co-operation was therefore seen as a necessary evil, offering a way for SNAs to 
level the playing field in this competitive environment. In this way TN reinforces 
competition between localities, rather than softening it (Pflieger, 2014, p. 333). 
Assessing the context, constraints and opportunities 
In all cases, subnational participation in TN was a reaction to a number of contextual 
factors which acted as potential constraints or opportunities. This manifests itself in 
different ways depending on the specific benefit being sought. In obtaining funding, for 
example, SNAs recognized the restrictive financial context in which they operated. 
Indeed all of the SNAs studied faced continued budget cuts as both central government 
grants and local tax revenues were reducing, something affecting SNAs across the EU. 
Nevertheless, SNAs also recognized the availability of a wide range of schemes and co-
operation programmes such as Interreg and URBACT, which offered funding for 
projects they otherwise would not be able to afford, provided they work with partners in 
other European countries. In this way TN was an opportunity structure which provided 
SNAs with a way to address the impact of this adverse financial context and take 
  
advantage of EU-funded programmes. As highlighted in a Kent County Council (2011) 
report: 
The last year has also, of course, continued to be dominated by heavy 
pressure on public funding and budgetary reductions within the County 
Council. Such domestic pressures might have made it more difficult for 
KCC to maintain an outward-looking focus and international profile. 
However, the contribution of EU funding to business priorities and the 
identification of European best-practice and collaborative working to 
improve performance makes this activity even more important in the current 
climate. 
This applied beyond obtaining funding. In seeking to influence EU policy, SNAs 
estimated between 70 and 80 per cent of EU legislation directly impacted them (Kent 
County Council, 2007a; West Sussex County Council, 2006). SNAs therefore saw 
themselves as implementers of EU legislation, but under-represented in EU decision-
making: 
Local authorities are primarily seen as implementers and enforcers of EU 
policy and legislation, but in spite of this have traditionally had a weak 
voice in the EU decision-making process. (West Sussex County Council, 
2006) 
SNAs felt they were better placed to inform discussion on EU policy given their role in 
implementation and their propinquity to citizens. As highlighted in one report: 
It is important that local government continues to be recognised as a 
legitimate actor in European affairs. It is the level that delivers key services 
  
to residents, businesses and the voluntary sectors and as such is in a 
favourable position to provide input to the EU institutions on how European 
policies and legislation work on the ground. (Isle of Wight Council, 2004) 
SNAs recognized that the EU was receptive to local opinion and this presented an 
opportunity to become involved. Yet they equally appreciated that they were unable to 
have a significant impact acting individually given their limited size and resources. The 
EU policy arena was perceived as a competitive environment in which individual SNAs 
would be drowned out by other well-resourced corporate and non-governmental 
interests, in addition to other local and regional actors. 
Cost–benefit analyses and depoliticization 
SNA engagement in TN is based on a favourable cost–benefit analysis. This is most 
evident with the funding motivation, where the potential gain of finance through EU 
grants was seen as far greater than the costs associated with networking. As one 
councillor noted: 
It’s probably a total cost of £100,000 of our membership of groups and 
sending people to various delegations … but we want to be sure that we’re 
receiving in return … more than that, and normally it’s operating at many 
many times. It’s not unusual for us to be collecting something like £2million 
a year or so, something like that, in grants from various European 
projects.[15] 
Indeed, another remarked that if they stopped investing in TN their authority would be 
losing over £10million a year in the benefits it brought.[16] Committee documentation 
approving engagement in TN also rationalized participation in simple cost–benefit 
  
terms, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
This cost–benefit calculation applied to motivations beyond obtaining funding. 
In lobbying SNAs recognized the burden and costs associated with implementing EU 
legislation and so sought to lower these costs. Influencing EU policy development 
through TN was thus seen as a low cost method for achieving this. This fits with 
Börzel’s (2002, p. 196) explanation of Europeanization where uploading local policy 
preferences can be regarded as ‘an effective strategy to maximize the benefits and 
minimize the costs of European policies’. Indeed, participants felt that if SNAs failed to 
influence the EU, policy would ultimately be detrimental for them, particularly if they 
disagreed with the policy in the first place. As one explained: 
If you look at legislation, often it’s gold-plated, so bells and whistles get 
added onto things. If you don’t want those bells and whistles on there, if you 
don’t even want the piece of legislation in the first place, then you have to 
make your voice heard and explain why that is.[17] 
In undertaking policy transfer SNAs again recognized the potential savings and 
efficiencies that could be found by applying lessons from abroad. In the words of one 
councillor, ‘you could suddenly wake up to all sorts of potential ideas and cost 
savings’.[18] Again, this emphasizes that SNAs are undertaking a cost–benefit analysis 
when deciding to engage in TN; the cost of participation is outweighed by the 
efficiencies and financial savings gained by applying best practice techniques leant 
through policy transfer. 
In this way participation in TN became depoliticized. Local officials perceived 
the level of funding which could be obtained, or the savings which could be realized, to 
  
be so great that it overrode councillors’ political views on TN, or indeed the EU more 
generally. As one noted: 
I would generally say overall a Conservative administration … would 
probably take the view that Europe was something that existed. They didn’t 
particularly want to deal with it, but if there was money to be had they 
would have it.[19] 
Councillors themselves referred to the ‘pragmatic approach’ they took to TN, and that 
party politics was absent from the debate.[20] This pragmaticism explains why SNAs 
were able to co-operate despite the sometimes radically different political ideologies 
held by their respective leaders and administrations. Indeed, co-operation was more 
likely to be hindered by differences in bureaucratic and working cultures. Party political 
differences, be they internal or external to a SNA, were rarely a barrier.[21] 
Awareness of limitations of transnational networking 
In undertaking their cost–benefit analysis, SNAs were aware of the limitations to TN. 
For each of the potential benefits sought participants provided words of caution. In 
seeking to obtain funding, for example, SNAs were mindful of the significant upfront 
investment required to put together a bid and the onerous nature of applying for and 
managing EU grants (East Sussex County Council, 2000; Kent County Council, 2007b, 
2010). SNAs would only pursue it if the likely benefits, financial or otherwise, would 
make the effort of administration and meeting eligibility criteria worth undertaking. 
While SNAs were motivated to participate in TN because of the lobbying and policy 
transfer benefits, they were equally aware of how such benefits were hard to quantify, 
and that success in these areas was not guaranteed. Again, this supports the rationalist 
  
account. SNAs were willing to engage in TN, but recognized the limits and would only 
participate if they benefits made the effort and risk worthwhile. 
Absence of sociological drivers 
The analysis reveals limited evidence of sociological drivers motivating participation in 
TN. There was evidence to suggest behaviour gradually changed as time was spent 
participating in transnational networks. As noted, SNAs seeking to obtain funding 
discovered other benefits such as policy transfer, for example. However, any 
internalization of norms was limited, and once engaged in TN, future participation was 
not guaranteed. This is confirmed by the fact that when TN no longer met or even 
threatened SNAs’ interests, they withdrew or altered their activity accordingly. Several 
examples illustrate this. West Sussex left the AER as it felt the network was not 
adequately representing its voice in Europe (West Sussex County Council, 2000). 
Hampshire left the CPMR in 2012 as it found out a number of other SNAs in the 
network had not paid their membership fees but were still benefiting from membership. 
In this case Hampshire felt it was disadvantaged by subsidizing membership for other 
non-paying regions, so left.[22] Hampshire and Basse-Normandie began working on 
divergent policy areas and consequently had different priorities. This meant their 
bilateral transnational link stagnated, as opportunities for policy transfer became 
limited.[23] 
Additionally, motivations which went beyond SNAs’ self-interest were rarely 
present. Even where they were, such motivations were supplementary. Only two 
participants referred to TN as a contribution to the wider European integration 
process.[24] Its role to secure peace in Europe was only mentioned by one 
participant.[25] Similarly, only one participant explicitly referred to the role of TN in 
  
making their SNA become more ‘European’.[26] While many SNAs used TN to 
enhance their profile and promote themselves as ‘European’ or ‘international’ actors, 
this was a strategy to secure other benefits, such as economic investment, influence or 
funding. Consequently there is limited evidence to suggest SNAs followed the logic of 
appropriateness when participating in TN. 
Conclusion 
Engagement in TN is one way local level Europeanization manifests itself. However, 
recognizing participation in EU engagement activities is voluntary, questions are raised 
about what drives SNAs in unitary and centralized polities to undertake this activity 
when they lack the formal competence to do so and face financial constraints limiting 
resources available. This article addressed this by investigating the underlying logic 
driving local level Europeanization processes and engagement in TN. Europeanization 
literature offers two potential explanations. On the one hand actors follow the logic of 
consequentialism, pursuing their interests and engaging with Europeanization processes 
based on cost–benefit analyses (rational Europeanization). On the other hand actors 
follow the logic of appropriateness, engaging with Europeanization processes because it 
is deemed appropriate to do so (sociological Europeanization) (Börzel and Risse, 2003; 
Hamedinger and Woffhardt, 2010). 
The article finds engagement in TN among the SNAs studied is rationally 
driven. There are five aspects to this. Firstly, SNAs were goal orientated. Participation 
was linked to pre-existing strategic objectives and SNAs did not change their priorities 
to ensure a fit with TN. Secondly, SNAs sought to improve their position versus others 
who were competing for limited funding and opportunities for policy influence and 
economic investment. Thirdly, SNAs’ participation was in response to an assessment of 
  
the prevailing context and the constraints and opportunities this produced. Fourthly, 
participation followed a positive cost–benefit analysis, where the costs of engagement 
were perceived to be lower than the benefits gained. This depoliticized TN and 
decisions to participate were marked by pragmaticism. Fifthly, SNAs were aware of the 
limits to what TN could achieve. Additionally, there was an absence of sociological 
drivers. Motives which went beyond self-interest were rarely present, and, crucially, 
participation did not become an internalized norm. Indeed, participation ceased where 
SNAs felt it no longer met their interests. 
In the cases studied, then, the overall picture is one where SNAs follow the logic 
of consequentialism, rather than the logic of appropriateness. While this article has 
focused on 14 SNAs, similar rationalist behaviour in TN engagement has been observed 
elsewhere (Pflieger, 2014; van der Heiden, 2010). This also corroborates research 
investigating broader international engagement activities undertaken by SNAs, showing 
they make deliberate decisions to get involved based on local circumstances, rather than 
being ‘mere leaves in the wind of internationalisation’ (Lefevre and d’Albergo, 2007, p. 
317). 
These findings have two implications for understanding local level 
Europeanization and the wider EU–local relationship. Firstly, regarding the rationalist–
sociological models of local level Europeanization, the findings suggest SNAs are 
driven by a rationalist logic, rather than a normative one. While the EU offers 
opportunities for European engagement, SNAs make their own decisions about whether 
to take advantage of them. SNAs are not compelled to participate in TN and only do so 
based on their pre-determined goals and if the benefits are perceived to outweigh the 
costs. This partly explains the differentiation of SNAs’ engagement at the European 
level. Priorities and resources vary between individual SNAs, so their level of 
  
engagement will too. This points future research on local level Europeanization, and 
SNAs’ broader international engagement activities, to focus on SNAs themselves, as 
locally held motives and resources, and local context, are important factors in whether 
SNAs engage at the EU level. 
Secondly, while the presence of SNAs at the EU level is increasingly 
recognized, the findings suggest their perpetual involvement is not guaranteed. Rather 
SNAs’ engagement is only assured while it remains in their interest. The cases of 
disengagement from TN revealed in this article emphasize this. This becomes important 
at a time when both SNAs’ resources and the opportunities available to them are 
marked by uncertainty. Budgetary pressures have already led SNAs to reassess and, in 
some cases, cease EU engagement activities (Guderjan, 2015, p. 944; Guderjan and 
Miles, 2016, p. 642). Brexit represents another area of uncertainty likely to affect local 
level Europeanization processes. This does not necessarily mean SNAs’ engagement in 
TN, or at the EU level more generally, will cease. Examples of Swiss SNAs 
participating in European TN show how EU membership is not a prerequisite, provided 
opportunities for engagement are available and SNAs feel it is worthwhile (van der 
Heiden, 2010). Furthermore, examples of broader international engagement undertaken 
by SNAs show that TN is increasingly global in nature and not exclusive to the EU 
(Bouteligier, 2013; Lee, 2014). 
Overall these findings have broader significance beyond the cases studied and 
beyond local level Europeanization. SNAs are subject to increasingly transformative 
processes. This not only includes the impact of Europeanization, but also wider trends 
such as territorial rescaling and the emergence of global networked spaces. This article 
shows that rather than being passive actors responding to these transformative 
processes, SNAs are actively shaping them. 
  
Endnotes 
1. These cases represent the highest level of directly elected subnational government. 
They are Kent County Council, Medway Council, East Sussex County Council, 
Brighton and Hove City Council, West Sussex County Council, Hampshire County 
Council, Portsmouth City Council, Southampton City Council and the Isle of 
Wight Council in South East England, and the regional councils of Nord-Pas de 
Calais, Picardie, Haute-Normandie, Basse-Normandie and Bretagne in Northern 
France. Fieldwork was conducted before the amalgamation of French régions in 
2016. 
2. Interview with transnational network staff, July 2012 (Int. 23). 
3. Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 24). 
4. Interviews with English local officer, May 2012, and former English local officer, 
May 2012 (Int. 08; Int. 09). 
5. Interview with French regional officer, July 2012 (Int. 44). 
6. Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 12). 
7. Interview with English local officer, September 2012 (Int. 45). 
8. Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 36). 
9. Interview with multilateral network staff, July (Int. 09). 
10. Interviews with English local officers, May 2012 and August 2012 (Int. 08; Int. 29; 
Int. 51). 
11. Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 14). 
12. Bilateral agreements between for example Conseil régional de Bretagne and 
Województwo Wielkopolskie dated 2005, retrieved from 
http://www.bretagne.bzh/jcms/c_13544/cooperation-internationale-et-reseaux, 
between East Sussex County Council and Veszprém Megye Önkormányzata data 
  
1996, retrieved from http://www.sussexineurope.org/leweslinks/accord.htm, and 
between Kent County Council and Bács-Kiskun County General Assembly dated 
2004, retrieved through personal communication. 
13. Interview with former English local official, June 2012 (Int. 34). 
14. Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 01). 
15. Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 01). 
16. Interview with English councillor, May 2012 (Int. 05). 
17. Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 11). 
18. Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 02). 
19. Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 15). 
20. Interviews with English councillors, April 2012, May 2012 and November 2012 
(Int. 01; Int. 05; Int. 67). 
21. Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 21). 
22. Interview with English councillor, July 2012 (Int. 25). 
23. Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 37). 
24. Interviews with English councillor, April 2012, and transnational network staff, 
December 2012 (Int. 02; Int. 70). 
25. Interview with Local Government Association representative, April 2012 (Int. 03). 
26. Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 36). 
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Figure 1: Example of aligning transnational networks to strategic priorities 




Figure 2: (Example of funding results represented in cost–benefit terms (Kent County 
Council, 2007b) 
 
 
